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The Voice of the Funds

by Alfred F. Conard
The following article is a condensation of an address delivered
by the author on May 12, 1988 to a symposium of the Pension
Research Council at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania.
There are thousands of words in ERISA (the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act), but "voting" is not
one of them. In 1974, when the Act was adopted, Congress gave no thought to the voting of the enormous
number of shares that would be accumulated by the
funds that the Act protected.
Twelve years later, when the Federal Employees
Retirement System Act was adopted, the authors mentioned voting, but only to say that the votes should not
be cast by the executives, the boards, or the employees
of the fund.
In 1988, voting came out of the closet. Today, everybody in the pension world is talking about who should
cast the votes that go with fund shares, and on whose
side they should vote.

I. The reasons for concern
There are two main reasons for the eruption of concern about the voting of shares held by pension funds.
The conflicts of interest. One of the reasons is the
emergence into view of a pervasive conflict between the
interests of corporation executives and the interests of

investors; Jack Coffee called it "Shareholders versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web." The spectacular evidence of this conflict is the series of takeover
battles, in which bidders offer shareholders premiums
that average around 30 percent over market price, while
target executives exhaust corporation assets in preventing shareholders from receiving these premiums.
Figure 1 is a graphic presentation, copied from the
Journal of Financial Economics, of the financial effects
of tender offers on share values.
The diagram on the left shows the positive returns to
target shareholders in 211 bids that succeeded, while
the diagram on the right shows the negative returns in
91 bids that failed, from 1962 to 1976. More recent figures would only accentuate these observations.
· While takeover bids generally benefit target
shareholders when they are successful, they are less
beneficial to the shareholders of bidding companies,
as shown in Figure 2.
Here we see that shareholders of takeover bidders
lost market value even when bids succeeded, and even
more when bids failed.
All these figures are aggregates; they blend cases in
which target shareholders gained with cases in which
they lost, and cases in which bidder shareholders lost
with cases in which they gained. But the aggregates
offer convincing evidence that the executives of many
target companies are acting against the interests of their
shareholders when they resist bids, while executives of
many bidding companies are acting against their shareholders' interest when they launch bids. The executives
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Figure 2: Returns to Bidders' Shareholders
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in these cases are like medieval kings, waging wars to
gain territory or to save their thrones without regard to
the welfare of their populations.
Takeovers are not the only area in which this conflict
emerges; they are just the area in which the conflict is
currently most obvious. The conflict exists .in many
other areas, such as executive compensation and
dividend distributions.
The conflict should not surprise us. It is exactly what
we should expect in an era in which shareholders have
lost control of corporations because of the dispersion of
individual holders, and the passivity of institutional
holders. A few years ago, financial economists propounded the theory that managerial fidelity was
enforced by the "market for control." But a series of
successful defenses against takeover bids, with judicial
approval, have destroyed any illusion about the efficiency of that market.

Figure 3: Percentages of Firm
Equity Held by Funds
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The power of funds. The second reason why the
fiduciary duty in voting has become critical is the explosion of fund ownership of shares. In nearly half of
major corporations, more than half the shares are held
by pension funds, mutual funds, and other institutional investors, whom I designate collectively as "the
funds ." Figure 3 is a graphic presentation of the distribution of fund holdings in a sample of actively traded
securities on the New York Stock Exchange in 1987.
Starting at the right hand side of the figure, we see
a column representing the firms of which 70 to 80 percent of the shares were held by funds . The next column
shows the firms of which 60 to 70 percent were held by
funds . The third column represents the firms that were
50 to 60 percent fund-owned . Putting these groups together, the funds were majority owners in 38 of 100
firms. If we add in the next column, we find that 58 out
of 100 firms were more than 40 percent fund-owned.
These percentages would not be very important if the
funds that held these percentages numbered in the tens
of thousands, like individual shareholders. If that were
true, the possibilities of joint action by the funds would
be negligible. However, the number of reporting fund
shareholders in each firm was generally under 200, and
hardly ever over 1000.
Figure 4 shows the number of fund shareholdings
that comprised the reported majorities in the firms
surveyed.
The first column on the left shows that in 24 percent
of the firms that were majority-owned by funds, the
majority was comprised by no more than 100 funds .
The second column shows that in 34 percent of the
majority-owned firms, the majority was made up of 101
to 200 funds.
Moving to the right, we see smaller numbers of firms
in which the number of funds required to form a majority was higher, rising to more than 700. This sample
turned up no firm in which more than 800 funds were

•••••••••••••••
Figure 4: Number of Fund
Shareholdings Comprising a
Majority
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grew threefold, from about 11 to about 31 percent. The
middle line shows that pension funds grew fivefold,
from about 4 to about 20 percent of equities. The lowest
line is that of public pension funds, which grew thirtyfold, from about a sixth of one percent to 5 percent.
They are likely to grow even further as a consequence
of the Federal Employees' Retirement System, which is
just getting under way.
The growth of fund holdings means not only that
funds have the power to defend the interests of shareholders against the conflicting interests of executives,
but that if they do not, nobody will. In more and more
corporations, the noninstitutional shareholders are
dwindling to impotent minorities.

II. How Funds Vote
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required to make up a majority of shares. Even AT&T,
which has over two million shares, had only 789 reported fund shareholders.
These data indicate that the mobilization of voting
majorities among funds is no longer beyond the bounds
of possibitity. If funds would vote together, they could
block the adoption of shark repellents in many corporations, and even elect directors of their choice. These
possibilities have led some of the public pension funds
to unite in the Council of Institutional Investors to develop common policies on corporate governance.
The importance of these numbers is enhanced by the
rate at which fund shareholdings have been growing
over the past quarter-century, as indicated by Figure 5.
This diagram shows the continued growth of all fund
shareholdings from 1961to1986, as measured by the
Federal Reserve Board. The top line shows that fund
holdings, as a percent of all publicly traded equities,

Figure 5: Growth of Funds'
Equity Holdings, 1961-1986
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Although the funds would have enormous power if
they voted together, they will not do so. Voters in company elections have different opinions, just as voters in
political elections. But they also split along lines that
seem unlikely to reflect random differences of opinion.
The most conspicuous split is between "public"
funds, such as the state employee pension funds of
California, New York, and New Jersey, and the private
"investment managers." The latter are the professional
financial advisers and agents whose principal clients
are corporate pension funds, such as those of General
Motors or General Electric. The officers of the public
funds generally owe their jobs to elected government
officials. The private investment managers usually owe
their service contracts principally to officials of the
sponsoring corporations, although union officials may
have had some input.
A survey conducted by the Investor Responsibility
Research Center shows a striking divergence between
the votes of public pension funds and the votes of
private investment managers on five antitakeover
measures proposed by company managers, as
shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Votes on Management
Proposals by IRRC Survey
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This table shows that public pension funds voted

against takeover defenses in the ratio of 61 to 39, on the
average, while investment managers voted in favor of
takeover defenses in the same ratio. The divergence is
particularly marked in the first two items, which are
most directly related to takeovers. Public pension funds
voted against classified boards, 90 percent to 10, while
investment managers split 50-50. Proposals to authorize
blank preferred stock, which were opposed by majorities of both groups, were opposed by public funds in
the ratio of 88 to 12, and by investment managers in the
ratio of 65 to 35.
Since plausible arguments can be made for a vote on
either side of these proposals, the sources of the divergence are speculative. One can imagine that private
investment managers, being themselves in the private
sector, are less suspicious of the motives of company
managements than are the state employees that manage the public funds . However, a substantial number
of investment managers have reported feeling pressure
from corporate sponsors of funds; a significant part of
the difference is probably attributable to these pressures, rather than to differences in analysts' opinions
on the economic benefits of takeover defenses.
The pressure of sponsors puts investment managers
in a bind. In many instances, they would serve the interest of beneficiaries by voting against management
proposals; but if they did, they might impair their access to information, and even lose their jobs to other
investment managers who are more compliant.
The result is even more unfortunate for the national
economy. It means that there is sometimes no cure,
short of bankruptcy, for inefficient or self-serving
managements. This might be called the acquired immune deficiency syndrome of American business.
Fortunately, the disease does not infect all companies;
but it may spread if more and more fund shareholders
become paralyzed by the pressures that fund sponsors
exert upon investment managers.

III. Therapeutics
Funds cannot accomplish much for their beneficiaries
by voting for or against the charter amendments that
company managers propose, or by voting on the peripheral proposals that shareholders are permitted to
insert in the company proxy statement. The only means
by which funds can assure that corporate managements
will operate in the interest of fund beneficiaries is to
choose the directors. This is the statutory model of
corporate governance, as diagrammed in Figure 6.
If funds would elect directors who represent the interests of shareholders rather than those of incumbent
executives, investors would not have to worry about
takeover bids and takeover defenses that conflict with
shareholder interests. Investor-oriented directors would
make sure that these and other activities are conducted
in the interest of shareholders, rather than of incumbent
executives. Even better, inefficient executives would be
removed without the destruction of takeover wars.
34

Figure 6: The Statutory Model
of Corporate Governance
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Why doesn't it happen?
There are several obstacles. Some of them are in
the institutions' own attitudes; others are in the legal
system.
The free rider problem. To organize a voting bloc,
someone has to take the lead. The fund that initiates action will pay the bill, and the others will get a free ride.
For a private investment manager who is in price competition with others, this consideration may preclude
initiating action. But this obstacle is being overcome by
the initiatives of public and nonprofit funds, which private investment managers can support without
spending their own time and money.
Until recently, the public funds' initiatives were
limited to voting on management and shareholder
proposals. But Edward Regan, Comptroller of the State
of New York, broke the ice in 1987 with a proclamation
in favor of funds' activism in electing directors. The
best hope for pension fund beneficiaries is that public
funds will initiate nominations, and that private fund
investment managers will vote with the public funds.
Exposure to pressures. When investment managers
start thinking about the possible advantages of joining
in the initiatives of the public funds, they think also of
the flak that they will get from fund sponsors and from
the issuers of the securities that they must analyze. Investment managers will be hobbled unless they can be
insulated from these pressures.
One witness at the Pension Fund Hearings proposed
that Congress should prohibit issuers from pressuring
funds and investment managers. I would not expect
this to have much effect because pressure can be exerted so invisibly. If an issuer or sponsor quietly terminates an investment manager's employment, there will
be no evidence of crime, but other investment managers
will know why it happened.
An alternative solution was adopted in 1988 by a
few corporations as a result of negotiations between
corporations and funds. This is a secret ballot, tallied
by accountants who will not reveal to corporations the
votes of particular shareholders. Not many corporations, however, will accept this arrangement voluntarily.
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To be widely adopted, it would have to be imposed by
statute, or by an addition to the SEC proxy rules.
Control liabilities. A major apprehension that deters
investment managers from even contemplating the
installation of directors of their choice is their fear of
liability for "control." The fear is stimulated by cases
in which banks have been held liable for coercing companies to pursue policies that proved to be disastrous.
What these cases tell us is that funds should not tell
portfolio firm executives how to run their business.
They should not even tell directors whom to choose for
CEO. But these cases offer no threat to investment managers who elect directors, and leave each director free
to manage the firm, or oversee its management, "in a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interest
of the corporation," as commanded by the widely
copied Model Business Corporation Act.
A more serious peril to activist shareholders emanates, ironically, from the SEC, which ought to be
working for investors, rather than against them. The
threat inheres in the SEC's definition of "control," which
embraces "the possession, direct or indirect, of the
power to direct or cause the direction of management
and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." A
literal reading of this definition embraces any aggregation of shareholders, institutional or otherwise, that
commands a majority of votes.
Under other provisions of the Securities Act and
the Securities Exchange Act, "controlling persons" are
liable for all the securities law transgressions of the corporation that they "control" unless they can bear the
burden of proof that they lacked knowledge of, or influence upon, the relevant events. Even more serious from
the viewpoint of an investment manager, "controlling
persons" are forbidden to sell their shares without filing
a registration statement, or conforming to the narrow
exemption of Rule 144.
In the face of these perils, investment managers are
justifiably reluctant to join in voting blocs to elect directors. If the SEC wants corporations to be governed by
their shareholders, as Congress apparently intended
when it authorized proxy regulation, the SEC should
amend its definition of control to exclude direction that
is effectuated by electing directors and leaving them
free to direct.
Exclusion from the company proxy statement.
Another roadblock in the way of shareholder activism,
which the SEC could readily remove, is shareholders'
lack of access to the company proxy statement and
ballot. The proxy rules require that company proxy
statements tell shareholders all about the management's
nominees for directorships, the management's proposals
for executive compensation, and the management's
proposals to amend the charter. But they exclude
shareholders from using the company proxy statement
to present competing nominations, and arguments
against management proposals. The practical result is
like a Russian election, where the ballot provides an
opportunity to vote for the party's candidates and the

party's proposals, and citizens are not told about other
nominees or contrary arguments.
In a ceremonial genuflection to democratic ideas,
the SEC lets shareholders insert resolutions of their
own in the company proxy statement. But the Commission assures the emptinesss of the right by excluding
messages about the things that count - the election
of directors, and arguments against the proposals
of the management.
Fund managers and investment managers will never
be able to do much for their beneficiaries until Congress
or the SEC provides that shareholders have the right to
present their candidates and their arguments in the company proxy statement and the company ballot, and to
elect directors of their choice without incurring liability
for "control."
On the other hand, Congress and the SEC are unlikely to change the rules in favor of fund activism until
private investment managers indicate an interest in
using their voting power in a constructive way.

Conclusion
The wasteful ways of the takeover game could be
greatly relieved if funds would join hands to protect the
interests of their beneficiaries. Howeve~ a kind of gridlock exists among the competitive interests of investment managers, the pressures exerted by the corporate
sponsors of funds, and the rules of the SEC. The current activities of public pension funds offer some hope
of breaking the logjam, but they cannot prevail until the
public funds are joined by some of the other actors on
the investment scene.
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